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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State timely appealed from the district court's order denying, in part, its 
motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the State argues that Idaho Code 
Section 18-8311 precludes a district court from retaining jurisdiction after a defendant is 
convicted for failing to register as a sex offender. Mr. Olivas responds by arguing that 
I.C. § 18-8311 contains no language precluding the district court from either suspending 
a sentence or retaining jurisdiction after a defendant has been convicted for failing to 
register as a sex offender. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In docket number 39683 (hereinafter, First Case), Mr. Olivas was indicted on two 
counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years and one count of 
attempted sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years. (R., pp.19-21.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Olivas pleaded guilty to one count of sexual abuse of 
a child under the age of sixteen years and, in return, the State agreed to dismiss the 
remaining charges. (R., pp.40-42.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.63-64.) 
Upon review of Mr. Olivas' period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter "rider"), the district 
court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Olivas on probation for a period of seven 
years. (R., pp.71-73.) Mr. Olivas was also required to register as a sex offender 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-301, et seq. (R., pp., 63-64, 68-73.) 
In docket number 39682 (hereinafter, Second Case), Mr. Olivas was charged 
with failure to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.156-157.) Pursuant to a plea 
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agreement, Mr. Olivas pleaded guilty to the charge of failure to register as a sex 
offender. (R., pp.160-162.) The State also filed a petition for probation violation in the 
First Case and Mr. Olivas admitted that he violated the terms of his probation. 
(R., pp.99-101.) At a consolidated sentencing/probation violation disposition hearing, 
the district court revoked probation in the First Case and, in the Second Case, imposed 
an indeterminate sentence of five years, to run consecutive to the sentence in the First 
Case. (R., pp.103-109, 163-165.) The district court also retained jurisdiction in both 
cases. (R., pp.103-109, 163-169.) 
The State then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion 
alleging that the district court imposed an illegal sentence. (R., pp.110-11 170-173.) 
Specifically, the State argued that I.C. § 18-8311 did not allow the district court to retain 
jurisdiction because the statute requires probation to be revoked, in the First Case, and 
the sentence in the Second Case to run consecutively to the sentence in the First Case. 
(R., pp.110-113, 170-173.) Based on the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding in State v. 
Brown, 153 Idaho 781 (Ct. App. 2011 ), the district court concluded that it could not 
retain jurisdiction in the Second Case, but that it could retain jurisdiction in the First 
Case. (R., pp.125-129, 188-191.) Accordingly, the district court denied the State's 
motion as to the First Case and granted the Motion as to the Second Case. 
(R., pp.125-129, 188-191, 202-203.) 
Upon review of Mr. Olivas' rider in the First Case, the district court suspended his 
sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp.119-122, 130-135, 179-181.) 
The State timely appealed. (R., pp.119-121, 179-181.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court violate Idaho Code § 18-8311 when it retained jurisdiction and 
subsequently reinstated Mr. Olivas on probation in the underlying criminal case after 
Mr. Olivas failed to register as a sex offender while on probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Did Not Violate Idaho Code § 18-8311 When It Retained Jurisdiction 
And Subsequently Reinstated Mr. Olivas On Probation In The Underlying Criminal Case 
After Mr. Olivas Failed To Register As A Sex Offender While On Probation 
A. Introduction 
The district court did not violate I.C. § 18-8311 when it retained jurisdiction 
because the statute does not contain any language precluding the district court from 
either suspending a sentence or retaining jurisdiction after a defendant has been 
convicted for failing to register as a sex offender. Since Idaho Code § 18-8311, is not 
an ambiguous statute, statutory construction is not necessary in this matter. The district 
court correctly adhered to the plain meaning of the statute when it decided to retain 
jurisdiction in the First Case. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court utilizes the following framework when interpreting a 
statute: 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which we exercise free 
review. It must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed 
as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but 
simply follows the law as written. A statute is ambiguous where the language is 
capable of more than one reasonable construction. 
City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69 (2003). 
C. By The Plain, Usual , And Ordinary Meaning Of The Words Contained Therein, 
Idaho Code § 18-8311 (1) Does Not Preclude A District Court From Retaining 
Jurisdiction After Imposing A Sentence Pursuant To The Statute 
Idaho Code § 18-8311 ( 1) reads as follows: 
An offender subject to registration who fails to register, verify his address, 
or provide any notice as required by this chapter shall be guilty of a felony 
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison system for a 
4 
period not to exceed ten (10) years and by a fine not to exceed five 
thousand dollars ($5,000). If the offender is on probation or other 
supervised release or suspension from incarceration at the time of the 
violation, the probation or supervised release or suspension shall be 
revoked and the penalty for violating this chapter shall be served 
consecutively to the offender's original sentence. 
I.C. § 18-8311 (1) (emphasis added). This statute requires three things of the district 
court: 1) it requires the court to sentence a defendant to a term of imprisonment not to 
exceed ten years; 2) assuming the court has jurisdiction to do so, it requires the district 
court to revoke the offender's probation; and 3) where a prior term of probation was 
revoked, it requires the district court to impose the sentence for failure to register as a 
sex-offender run consecutively to the sentence imposed upon revocation of the 
defendant's probation. Section 18-8311 (1) says nothing of the district court's ability to 
retain jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (4). 
Idaho Code § 18-8311(1) specifically uses the term "probation or other 
supervised release or suspension from incarceration." I.C. § 18-8311(1). Both 
I.C. § 19-2601(2) and § 19-2601(3) discuss a district court's power to "place the 
defendant on probation." I.C. § 19-2601 (2)-(3). However, Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4) 
allows a district court to execute a sentence, but retain jurisdiction for the first 365 days, 
and, within that 365 days, further allows the district court to suspend the remainder of 
the sentence and place the defendant on probation. I.C. § 19-2601 (4). Idaho Code § 
18-8311 (1) contains no mention whatsoever of the ability of the district court to retain 
Jurisdiction as described in I.C. § 19-2601(4), let alone a specific rebuke of ils language. 
The plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the words contained I.C. § 18-8311 (1) have 
no impact on a district court's power to retain jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (4). 
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1. The Clause "Shall Be Punished By Imprisonment," Does Not Negate A 
District Court's Ability To Retain Jurisdiction 
Although I.C. § 18-8311(1) speaks in apparent mandatory terms by stating that a 
defendant convicted of failing to register as a sex-offender "shall be punished by 
imprisonment," this language does not limit the district court's inherent power to 
suspend a sentence after a period of retained jurisdiction. In State v. Pena-Reyes, 131 
Idaho 656 (1998), the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a statute which 
"imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of five years for a guilty plea to trafficking in 
cocaine, which 'shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld."' Id. The Idaho Supreme 
Court held as follows: 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 486 P.2d 247 
(1971 ), held the judiciary had the inherent right to suspend sentences. In 
1978, in response to McCoy, the legislature proposed and the people 
adopted an amendment to Article 5, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution, 
which added the following language: "provided, however, that the 
legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and 
any sentence imposed shall be not less than the mandatory minimum 
sentence so provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so imposed 
shall not be reduced." Idaho Const. art. V, § 13. This amendment 
effectively circumscribes the power of our courts to suspend a mandatory 
minimum sentence contained in a statute enacted pursuant to the 
authority of our constitution. 
Id. at 657. (citations in original). Idaho Courts have inherent authority to suspend a 
sentence, and that authority that can be circumvented solely where the legislature has 
enacted a statute specifically prescribing a mandatory minimum term. The legislature 
has on occasion chosen to enact such legislation but, when doing so, has explicitly 
stated its intention to circumvent the district court's inherent authority to suspend a 
sentence. For example, as was noted in Pena-Reyes, supra, Idaho Code § 37-
2732B(a)(8) reads as follows: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, with respect to any person 
who is found to have violated the provisions of this section, adjudication of 
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guilt or the imposition or execution of sentence shall not be suspended, 
deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for parole prior to 
serving the mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment prescribed in 
this section. Further, the court shall not retain jurisdiction. 
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(S) (emphasis added). In contrast, I.C. § 18-8311(1) neither 
delineates a mandatory minimum sentence wherein the district court is specifically 
precluded from suspending, deferring or withholding the execution of the sentence, nor 
explicitly states that a district court cannot retain jurisdiction. Thus, in enacting I.C. § 
18-8311 (1 ), the legislature did not announce an intention to circumscribe a district 
court's inherent authority to suspend a sentence or retain jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, Idaho's persistent violator statute, I.C. § 19-2514, which 
contains language similar to I.C. § 18-8311 provides an example of a statute that does 
not preclude a district court from retaining jurisdiction. Idaho Code Section 19-2514 
contains the following language: 
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony, 
whether the previous convictions were had within the state of Idaho or 
were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent 
violator of law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term in 
the custody of the state board of correction which term shall be for not less 
than five (5) years and said term may extend to life. 
In State v. Toyne, 151 Idaho 779 (Ct. App. 2011 ), the district court interpreted the 
foregoing language to require a mandatory minimum five year term of imprisonment. 
The district court also reasoned that even if the statute allowed it to retain jurisdiction it 
would not because I. C. § 19-2514 "did not allow the court to suspend the sentence at 
the end of the" rider and, thus, "such a disposition would be pointless." Id. at 781. The 
Court of Appeals disagreed and employed the following rationale in reversing the district 
court: 
When the legislature has intended to require that a prescribed 
minimum sentence be a fixed term, without opportunity for probation or 
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other sentencing alternatives, it has demonstrated its ability to make that 
intent entirely clear. For example, Idaho Code § 37-27328 specifies that 
offenses of trafficking in certain controlled substances carry "mandatory 
minimum fixed term(s) of imprisonment," and "[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law, with respect to any person who is found to have violated 
the provisions of this section, adjudication of guilt or the imposition or 
execution of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor 
shall such person be eligible for parole prior to serving the mandatory 
minimum fixed term of imprisonment prescribed in this section. Further, 
the court shall not retain jurisdiction." I.C. § 37-27328(8). 
When, however, the statute provides only that a particular crime is 
punishable by a term of custody or imprisonment of not less than a 
specified number of years, it has generally been held that the statute does 
not require that this term be fixed. 
Id. at 782-783 (original emphasis). The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that 
I.C. § 19-2514 did not preclude the district court from either retaining jurisdiction or 
suspended the sentence. Id. at 783. Since I.C. § 18-8311 is similar to I.C. § 19-2514 in 
that I.C. § 19-2514 uses "shall be punished by imprisonment" and I.C. § 18-8311 states 
that "probation . . . shall be revoked" and that the new sentence "shall be served 
consecutively to the offender's original sentence .... " This is the very type of language 
the Court of Appeals determined does not create a mandatory prison term in Toyne. 
Furthermore, even if I.C. § 18-8311(1) could be interpreted as a legislative act 
eliminating a district court's inherent authority to suspend a sentence from the outset, 
while not violating Article 5 § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, its plain language does not 
eliminate a district court's authority to retain jurisdiction and later suspend the sentence 
and place the defendant on probation. Where a defendant is convicted of violating 
I.C. § 18-8311 (1 ), the defendant "shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison 
system for a period not to exceed ten (10) years and by a fine not to exceed five 
thousand dollars ($5,000)." I.C. § 18-8311 (1) (emphasis added). A district court 
retaining jurisdiction under I.C. § 19-2601(4), in fact, orders the defendant to be 
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imprisoned in the state prison system for up to days (with the possibility of an 
additional 30) - a period that does not vA\J""""' 10 years. I.C. § 19-2601(4). The plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning of I.C. § 18-8311 (1) allows the district court to retain 
jurisdiction. 
In sum, the Idaho Legislature uses very specific language when it writes a 
sentencing statute which curtails a district court's ability to either suspend a sentence or 
retain jurisdiction. Since I.C. § 18-831 'l does not contain any language creating a 
mandatory sentence or precluding a district court from either suspending a sentence or 
retaining jurisdiction, the district court in this matter did not err when it retained 
jurisdiction in the First Case. 
The State's Reliance On State v. Brown, 153 Idaho 781 (Ct. App. 2011). Is 
Misplaced As The Court of Appeals In That Case Ignored The Plain 
Meaning Of I.C. § 18-8311 Even Though The Statute Is Not Ambiguous 
In State v. Brown, 153 Idaho 781, 782 (Ct. App. 2011), Mr. Brown was on 
probation for grand theft. He then pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. 
Id. In the grand theft case, the district court revoked probation for Mr. Brown's guilty 
plea to failure to register as a sex offender. Id. The court then executed his sentence 
and retained jurisdiction. Id. In the failure to register case, the district court imposed a 
sentence consecutive Mr. Brown's sentence in the grand theft case, but refused to 
retain jurisdiction based on its interpretation of I.C. § 18-8311. Id. Mr. Brown appealed 
from the judgment iii the failure to register case, but he did not timely appeal from the 
order revoking probation and, for that reason, the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to 
answer the question of whether I.C. § 18-8311 would prevent a district court from 
retaining jurisdiction in the grand theft case. Id. at 782 n.1. The Court of Appeals did 
hold that the district court correctly concluded that I.C. 18-8311 precluded it from 
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retaining jurisdiction in the failure to register case. Id. at 783. Specifically, the Court of 
Appeals held: 
The State asserts that whether or not the statute allows retention of 
jurisdiction, in this case, the district court was effectively precluded from 
retaining jurisdiction. The State argues that since Brown's grand theft 
sentence was executed, Brown was required to serve at least the two-year 
determinate term in that case. Consequently, the district court in this case, 
as a practical matter, could not retain jurisdiction because the period of 
retained jurisdiction would run prior to the expiration of Brown's two-year 
determinate term. Since it is uncontested that the statute requires a 
mandatory sentence of imprisonment in this case to run consecutive to the 
imprisonment in the grand theft case, the court could not retain jurisdiction 
in this case. We agree. The statute requires a sentence of imprisonment in 
this case to be served consecutive to the grand theft sentence. The 
district court could not retain jurisdiction consecutive to the grand theft 
sentence. A period of retained jurisdiction begins to run the time of 
sentencing. LC § 19-2601 (4). 
Id. (footnote omitted). Brown is inapposite because the district court, in the instant 
matter, determined that it could retain jurisdiction in the First Case which is procedurally 
analogous to the grand theft case in Brown, and the Court of Appeals expressly refused 
to decide whether I.C. § 18-8311 precluded the district court from suspending the 
sentence in the grand theft case or retaining jurisdiction in the grand theft case. Id. at 
782 n.1. As such, Brown does not control the question in this matter. 
More importantly, the Brown Opinion should not control because it runs afoul of 
the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 894-896 (2011 ). 1 In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court 
clarified that Idaho courts do not have the authority to "[revise] or [void] an unambiguous 
statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results when 
construed as written .... " Id. However, this is what occurred the Brown, as the Court 
1 The Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of the Verska Opinion at the time it 
published the Brown Opinion, as Brown was published on August 16, 2011 and Verska 
was published on November 9, 2011. 
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of Appeals engaged in statutory construction based on its implicit determination that the 
plain meaning of the statute would create an absurd result due to the fact that 
Mr. Brown was serving his sentence in the grand theft case. The Court of Appeals 
stated that it does not matter whether I.C. § 18-8311 allows the district court to retain 
jurisdiction because, owing to the procedural peculiarities of Mr. Brown's case, the 
district court could not "as a practical matter" retain jurisdiction. Brown, 153 Idaho at 
783. In other words, the court of Appeals did not consider how the statute was written 
and decided that the district court could not retain jurisdiction based on the procedural 
results that retaining jurisdiction would have on Mr. Brown's sentences. However, 
Verska stated that even if a statute, as written, creates palpably absurd results Idaho 
courts must adhere to the statute's plain language. As such, Brown should not be 
considered controlling authority. 
As a final note, many of the State's argument's are not availing because they do 
not focus on the plain meaning of I.C. § 18-8311. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-9.) 
Instead, they focus on the results created by the district court's decision to retain 
jurisdiction in the First Case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-9.) For example, the State 
argues that it will be difficult for Mr. Olivas to adhere to the terms of probation in the 
First Case, while serving his sentence in the Second Case. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-
7 .) However, Verska stands for the proposition that Idaho courts have to adhere to the 
plain meaning of the statute even if the results are absurd. For that reason, the State's 
arguments, which focus on the outcome of the district court's adherence to I.C. § 18-
8311 do not matter, as Idaho courts cannot rewrite or void unambiguous statutes. 
In sum, Idaho Code Section 18-8311 is not an ambiguous statute and, as such, 
the Brown Opinion is not controlling because the Court of Appeals ignored the plain 
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meaning of the statute and determined as a matter of practicality that the district court 
could not retain jurisdiction. After the Supreme Court issued the Verska Opinion, such 
an action is no longer allowed in Idaho because departing from the plain language of an 
unambiguous statute runs afoul the judicial role of a district court. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Olivas respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
Memorandum Decision and Order Upon State's Motion for Correction of Illegal 
Sentence. 
DATED this 13th day of February, 201 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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